# 4 : Dealing With Bad Luck (Management)

Unlucky

 Little over 3 month pass before manager Tony Daggeron is unceremoniously sacked by Saint-Etienne, who had hired the Englishman in the middle of November, in hopes that he could lead the club to a mid-table season finish.
  The sacking of Daggeroni was bad luck on the coach, since the club was showing signs of improvement following the January transfer window. Daggeroni had accomplished his goal of bolstering the defense, bringing in veteran centre back Sebastien Squillaci - rescued from banishment on the Arsenal bench - while making astute moves in other areas of the squad.  The improvement at the back was immediate.


 Hidden Improvement

   Whereas Les Verts had allowed ten goals in five games prior to the Ligue 1 winter break,  Daggeroni's side allowed just five goals in the last six games. The addition of the influential veteran Squillaci at the back had solidified the defense. Daggeroni had actually signed two central defenders, but the other transfer was cancelled when the player failed his medical. The side were no longer leaking goals. But they weren't scoring them, either.
     The problem was the fact that Les Verts were a 'broken team',  a side with a few standout players, but nothing else, really.  Daggeroni had been forced due to lack of transfer funds - remember the wage bill problem - to 'get creative' in improving the club's goalscoring after the departure of their main goalscorer, Patrick Aubameyang. 
 

Scraping It Together

Having now committed his club's strategy to playing 'long ball', and using a 4-3-3,  in which the key players were to be  three forwards employed as 'target men', supported by a three-man midfield composed mostly of ball-winning central midfielders. The build-up would be supported by the fullbacks Daggeroni had initially pegged as potential playmakers for his side, Clerc and Brison, to provide crosses from deep into the box.The two strikers Daggeroni had signed in January for a sum total of less than £300,000, were stop-gap players who would be of use to the side primarily in winning aerial balls to knock on to the now-'featured' striker in the side, Brandao.
  Daggeroni stuck with the crude, direct,  narrow 4-3-3 system through three matches, but scrapped it after watching his side score just one goal in that span. For the very next match, the coach dropped his stop-gap experimental strikers, and went to more of a 4-2-3-1 formation, with wingers who played as inside forwards, cutting into the pitch the support Brandao, now the sole target man up front.

 

 The results were promising. For the goal in the 58th minute of what would turn out to be the only goal of an otherwise tight match, the build up was pretty much the style of play Daggeroni had built his team to play in his short time at the club.  The move originated from the centre of the pitch through the midfield passers, was laid off the the inside forward, before being played into the forward, whose job was merely to 'finish'.

   It is worth noting that Saint-Etienne recorded that victory against the odds, a feat they would not have been able to accomplish had they been leaking goals at the back. Les Verts were definitely improving, definately heading in the right direction.
   The problem was, they weren't doing it fast enough.


A Grave Error? 





That surprise win over Montpellier would be the only victory Les Verts recorded under Tony Daggeroni's management. The side was held to draws in its next two matches, despite scoring goals in both of them. It was the first time in two months that the side had scored in consecutive games. As the media had pointed out, it looked as if the new manager's strategic and tactical adjustments were beginning to bear fruit. The defense had shown marked improvement, and now, it looked as if the midfield and attacking units were starting to gel. With more luck in future games, Les Verts would be able to eke out wins more frequently, and begin a stop-start climb to bottom half safety by season's end.
   The Fates put paid to that notion. Following the two draws, Saint-Etienne were embarassed 3-0 away to Nancy Lorraine. It was the side's third-consecutive match away from home, and the club simply didn't fire. So, the manager was. Les Verts - a club in turmoil - had fired their second manager in a single season after just three months, despite the fact that said manager had lost just three of his first eight matches. He had won just one,of course.  That was the problem.
     In a newspaper quote following his dismissal, Daggeroni was higly-critical of the board at Saint-Etienne, who he felt had made a 'grave error' in sacking him. Said Daggeroni,

'..the club was headed in the right direction, surely. But the board's expectations were unrealistic. When I arrived, Les Verts were a  side  entirely dependent on one player for their goals, a midfield devoid of any creativity whatsoever, and a bad defense. Add to this the fact that the club's finances were totally stretched - so much so that the only recourse for improvement was to sell their best player - and it was  a tense situation I inherited at the club.
   I made it work, though, by being creative in January. After the close of the window, we struggled to create goals, but I felt that I now had a side with a clear tactical identity, and that the results would come soon enough. But, just as the ball got rolling after the win over Montpellier, we were uninspiring in two drawn matches, then were dominated in a game. The board felt that they had seen enough of my management, and I was let go. The decison was, in my opinion, a grave error.
  Now, they'll be with either an interim manager for the rest of the term, or bring in someone else whose tactical approach may be wildly different from the one I had constructed at the club. And he'll be hamstrung in terms of tinkering with the side, being unable to sign new players, while being under immediate pressure of staving off relegation. I wish the club luck in that endeavor."

Conclusion

The unexpected, and perhaps unwarranted sacking of manager Tony Daggeroni after a short, ill-fated stint at his first club clearly shows the value of an FM™ player adopting a 'long view' approach to the simulation. The main issue in the case of Saint-Etienne was the board being out-of-touch with the realities facing their club. The club was in crisis financially, and the side is fairly 'broken' tactically. Such a situation means that a club cannot even begin to think of being a 'mid-table' club until one or both of those crises are addressed. Tony Daggeroni recognized this, and, using the 'build from the back' approach to team-building, began what he saw as a two or three season process in reshaping the club into a side capable of winning consistently. It was never, the manager said, going to happen in the second half of one season.
   And so, the manager moves on to pick up another club. He will do so, however,  no sooner than season's end. He will go on holiday shortly after clearing out his Saint-Etienne office, resurfacing in late May to sniff around the world for job openings.
   Before the 2012-13 season ends, however, two jobs will open up in the Spring, during the middle of March, 2013.


Caveat

Two openings materialize in Serie A during the middle of March, at the clubs Fiorentina and Lazio. The actions of the boards at these two clubs a similar to the sacking of Tony Daggeroni: late-season firings that will bring in new managers, but to what end? As stated, Daggeroni was planning to sit-out the rest of the 2012-13 season, but he decided to investigate the prospects facing the two Italian clubs out of curiosity.
   There are eleven games left to play in the Serie A season. ACF Fiorentina are in 10th, while Lazio are clearly under-performing, sitting in 17th position, with the same point-total as the top 'relegation' club, Sampdoria. Clearly, the aim for the run-in as far as Lazio are concerned is clear: avoid relegation. The club is in the bottom-half of the league in both goals for and against, so it is not much of a surprise that they have struggled this season; they're  not very good. They're probably not as bad as they look, sitting just above relegation, but there are clearly problems within the squad, seeing as Lazio are among the worst Serie A clubs in both goals for and against.  Why would the Lazio board axe a manager so late in the season, as if the club has within it some miraculous turnaround in the last eleven games? Daggeroni has no interest in seeing for himself whether or not such a turnaround is possible. He looks at Fiorentina.
   La Viola have been distinctly average for the 2012-13 season, sitting 10th in points, 11th in goals for, and 9th in goals against. They are the ultimate 'stay away' club for an FM™ player : a side with ambitons of 'European qualification', but not enough talent or luck to get over that hump. It is telling that just ten points separate 10th-placed Fiorentina from 2nd placed AC Milan.  But Tony Daggeroni knows that there is much more to Fiorentina's story than that. He knows that, like Saint-Etienne, the Fiorentina board are unrealistic in their perceptions of their squad's capabilities.  Obviously, a safe, mid-table finish by season's end is achievable by club, but nothing more. The fact that the previous manager was sacked despite these realities show that whoever the next  boss at Fiorentina is, he would likely endure a short, frustrating stay there. Daggeroni passes on applying to either club.

#3 : Playing Poker (( Selling Players))

Finding Suckers

One of the most important aspects of playing FM™ effectively is the ability to make astute moves in the buying and selling of players at the clubs the player manages during his or her career.
  In the previous post, manager Tony Daggeroni has been placed in the uncomfortable position of pretty much having to sell his top goalscorer and best player, Patrick Aubameyang, who has requested a transfer.  In addition to that, his club is facing a relegation battle - mostly due to having a horrendous central defense - and will need to bring in new players soon to have any chance of saving their season by staying in the first division. The club desperately needs to 'cash in' on their star striker now, at a point where his current form acts as an advertisement to clubs potentially interested in the player.
   Since the player is ready to leave, the timing actually couldn't be better for Daggeroni and Saint-Etienne. There is a good chance that the club can get maximum value for Aubameyang in the upcoming transfer window.

The Fish and the Shark

Patrick Aubameyang was an excellent signing for Saint-Etienne.  Purchased the previous season for just £875,000 from Serie A side, AC Milan, the Gabonese youngster is now listed as being worth over £10m. As veteran FM™ players would know, it is often possible to sell a player for double or perhaps triple the player's 'worth', if one handles the transfer with savvy, times the deal to coincide with peak interest, and targets the right clubs.
    For many of the top 'super' clubs in Europe, money is of little concern when it comes to buying players. Therefore, it makes sense for Daggeroni to play a bit of poker, to try and get a lot more money for his best player than the player is  worth. How much more should Daggeroni be trying to get?
   The Saint-Etienne manager decides to set a price almost double the listed player value as his asking price for Aubameyang: £20m.  He is careful, however, to check the box deselecting the option to 'transfer list' the player and set his squad status to unneeded, since this will undoubtedly lower the Aubameyang's value in the market, since it makes the club look desperate to sell. 
    In truth, Daggeroni is somewhat desperate to move the player on - the club need money quickly, and his side is in poor form -  but he is also determined to get value in any deal involving this player, sticking with his hunch that he can get significantly more than the striker is worth.

  

Reality Check

 Daggeroni's gambit to sell Aubameyang at almost double his value - £20m - is unsuccessful; there are no 'sucker' clubs who are clamoring so earnestly for the striker to value him at such a price. This is a reality check - Aubameyang may be good, but he's not the next Messi, the market is saying -  so Daggeroni knocks down the price by £5m, to £15m.
   After this move by the Saint-Etienne manager,  German giants, Bayern Munich, throw their hat into the ring, biting the bait at the new price point of £15m. This is good news, thinks Daggeroni, until he looks at the details of the deal the Bavarians are offering:

Bayern are willing to pay less than £5m up immediately, and want to stretch the payment of the rest of the  £15m price - £10.5m -  over the next two years! This is a laughable proposition,  one which the Saint-Etienne manager wastes little time in turning down.  Daggeroni knows Bayern are not cash-strapped, and can afford more than £5m up front. He knows the Germans are  trying to snooker him. 

     It is advisable that one demand that clubs interested in buying players from the player's club pay the asking price up front in one payment. One reason for this is that demanding the full amount in a lump sum will 'weed out' clubs who are being overly-ambitious in seeking a player they cannot really afford. The other reason is to avoid having clubs 'cry poor' and gettting away with the slick antics such as the one shown above.
   In this case, it is easy for the player to turn the offer down, since his club needs virtually all of the transfer fee to be available immediately for the purchase of other players. But as a rule, even if one is fortunate enough to manage a rich club, it's better to get the bulk of the fee in a lump sum when selling players. It's simply a neater way to do business.
  
Called Bluff

 Despite the fact that Tony Daggeroni is playing 'hardball' with Bayern Munich over the Aubameyang deal, he is mindful of the fact that his position is weakening, because Bayern are the only club interested in the player at a price above his listed value. He could try to 'call' Bayern's bluff, and stand pat at his asking price of £15m. But, with the transfer window due to open shortly, and knowing that he needs the financial flexibility to find a number of players to bolster his squad, Daggeroni wants to get the deal done as soon as possible.  He decides to come down once more, to £11m.
  

Handshake

 

 At this point, Bayern are happy enough with the asking price that they are willing to pay the £11m in a lump sum, a significant increase from their initial offer of just £4.5m up front. In a sense, the deal is win-win, since the Germans got their man without paying a significant premium - courtesy of having no competition in the bidding - while Tony Daggeroni got slightly more than his player was worth, and can now turn his attention  to buying the necessary players at the very start of the transfer window. The situation was handled astutely by both parties in the deal, which, were it a football match, would have been said to have ended in a draw.

Conclusion

There are few ways to have misery rain down on an FM™ player's head than for one to mismanage a club's finances through committing egregious errors in the transfer market. There are a number of principles a player can keep in mind to prevent them making costly mistakes when buying or selling players, but they require the player to be disciplined, able to stick to the implementation of them,  even in the face of all sorts of pressures to push deals through. To recap, here are some of the principles to keep in mind when dealing with transfers in FM™:

• Seek Value / Play Poker - There is no shame in a player setting an asking price two or even three times the amount their player is worth at the outset of trying to sell him. If there are no offers for the player, a manager can feel comfortable lowering the price, while still knowing that a sale - bulk up front - would still be more favorable for the selling club than the buyer. In some cases a club will play the 'sucker', and come in for the player at the inflated rate.

• Timing - Players bought in mid-season are purchased mostly due to needs than wants, and thus their value  tends to increase during this period.

  In the case of Patrick Aubameyang, would the player be worth more at the end of the season? Perhaps, given his surge into the upper echelon of Ligue 1 goalscorers this season, the striker's value would have increased much  more than it was at the end of December come June. But, maybe not. It is equally  possible that the player could suffer a long-term injury,  stop scoring goals, or have some other setback see his value plummet.  It makes no sense to delay the sale of a player in top form - and who wants to leave - at a club where, if results don't improve soon, could see the manager himself shown the door within weeks. All signs are pointing to the 'sell now' button.

• Pay Attention - One of the most foolish things for an FM™ player to do, is sign off on a deal at the 'news' screen without looking at the details of said deal on the transactions page. Although the details are shown in the news item, from experience we know that many players do not read transfer / contract details in the news feed. Therefore, agreeing on a major deal without looking at it in detail is simply lazy. 

As has been shown, had Tony Daggeroni agreed to the initial deal Bayern were offering, he would have been left with less than £5m at his disposal to buy players with, and would have had to settle for monthly payments spanning two years, when he knows not whether he will even be at the club for another few months. Due diligence on the manager's part dictates that he get the most money he can get in any deal he completes in January.

#2 : Taking the Long View...

     We rejoin Tony Daggeroni as he embarks upon his FM™ managerial career at Saint-Etienne. It is apparent from the outset that the 2012-13 season is going to be a struggle for Les Verts, to say the least. In the last post, we examined the factors that figured prominently in Daggeroni's decision to take the reins at Saint-Etienne. We saw that though the club was struggling, there were numerous positives - mostly seen in the quality of a few attacking players - upon which the side could improve in order to escape their current crisis.


No Quick Fix

 
The first month of results under Tony Daggeroni makes it clear that there will be no miracle turnaround for Les Verts, no string of victories on-the-trot to buck up the side's confidence. Saint-Etienne go winless through Daggeroni's first five league games, getting outscored on average at a 2:1 ratio.

  As anticipated, star striker Patrick Aubameyang has shown evidence of his brilliance, his best performance under Daggeroni coming in the 2-3 loss to Lyon, in Daggeroni's second game in charge.  The other players, namely the wide players,  Brison and Clerc, have done nowhere near what they were expected to. Aubameyang's brace against Lyon would be the only two goals the Gabonese would score in Daggeroni's first five matches. Tony Daggeroni did have to work around the recent injury of number two goalscorer, Brandao - who would miss the first three of the five games - but it was still expected that other players in the squad would pick up some of that slack. Instead,  Saint-Etienne have been absolutely anemic in attack.
     The main reason for this was the fact that in all of the five matches, Saint-Etienne were thoroughly outplayed in the midfield, and dismal in defense - the centre backs especially - despite Daggeroni adopting a direct, counter-attacking approach in the games,  in respect of the desire to keep the ball out of his side's half, and away from that back line.





Tactics 

Daggeroni experimented mostly  with a winger-oriented 4-4-2 formation, as well as a 3-6-1 and 3-5-2, before settling for a 4-3-3 in the fifth league game against Marseille. In his side's most competitive game - the 2-3 loss to Lyon - Daggeroni went to a 4-4-2 in the second half, after beginning the game with three at the back in an effort to stop prolific, powerful striker Bafetimbi Gomis. The 3-5-2 had worked well enough in the first half to neutralize Gomis, but Saint-Etienne still went into the half down two goals. In the second half of that match, the switch to the direct 4-4-2 allowed Aubameyang - being used as a poacher - to get on the end of long balls out of the defense, and the striker's cool finishing provided the first goal for Les Verts.
    The Lyon result was promising, but also  a cause for misplaced optimism. In retrospect, the Lyon game was a confirmation of what was apparent from the stats: Saint-Etienne were a poor club, with an outstanding player at one position. And now, as the holiday break loomed,  that player was looking for a move......

The Long View

Heading into the holiday break in Ligue 1 match play, Tony Daggeroni, the winless manager,   helms a club battling relegation, the third-worst goals against record, and a striker responsible for almost half his side's goals wanting to leave the club. The Saint-Etienne board hired Daggeroni with a mid-table finish as the mark to strive for this season. It is clear that the second half of the domestic campaign will be a fight for survival in the top division. For Tony Daggeroni, it would be  a fight for his job.
   Taking the 'long view' - an objective, top-down view of a club's prospects - it is clear that Saint-Etienne must 'aim low' in the near future. Daggeroni realizes two things : 1) he needs to buy at least two central defenders, and 2) he must sell his best, most valuable player, Aubemayang,  in order to fund that endeavor. There is no other choice. There will be no replacement striker, either. Saint-Etienne, Daggeroni decides, will have to scrape together goals somehow with players currently at the club,  but they must stop allowing anything like the two goals-per-match they allowed in the Englishman's first five matches. Daggeroni is confident that, with the purchase of two quality signings at centre-back, his side can at least stay 'in' matches long enough to allow the attacking players to snatch a goal or two, and secure winning results. This is his outlook for the rest of the 2012-13 Ligue 1 season.

Conclusion

Many FM™ players get too bogged-down early in their manager careers with micro-managing aspects of their current clubs, aspects which might be fruitless, due to the fact that there are bigger issues at the club thwarting such attention to detail. There are countless blogs and Youtube vlogs by individuals who tell the 'stories' of their manager careers match-by-match, day-by-day, presenting to the reader every detail about their running of the club.
    In my opinion, this is unecessary. Although it is sometime intriguing to read some of those blogs, following the thoughts of the contributors as if they are a public diary, it is more effective for an FM™ player to keep whatever happens in their careers in the context of telling a long story spanning decades of 'game world' time. The game opens for the majority of players at a date in which their manager avatars are 30-something. The game's 'time arc'  is meant to potentially cover decades of management for the player, with the player retiring after perhaps thirty or forty years. Therefore, it makes the most sense for one to not get too deeply-involved emotionally or managerially with the lesser clubs they are likely to manage early-on in their careers. That is, unless that is the player's goal for their careers, for whatever reason.
   In the Tony Daggeroni simulation, the player has pretty much set out a clear course of action for his club that spans half of a season; it is a broad,  relatively long-term view.  Taking the long view as outlined above proves to be incredibly accurate, if a player possesses the insight and brutal honesty  make a realistic assessment of his club's future....